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Abstract
This essay is an attempt to summarize a few core features of international organizational 
changes that are observable in several fields, especially in the organization of academic re-
search but also in development policy and probably several others. The main thesis here is 
that bureaucratic rule has taken on a new guise with a new temporality and new organiza-
tional forms. Cubicle Land is a metaphor for the decentralized, pluri-local form of organization 
that is based on a project logic and requires an entrepreneurial self. It is, as is argued in this 
essay, not apolitical, but a form of domination, if one takes Max Weber’s saying seriously that 
domination in everyday life is administration.
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1. Introduction
“Each office within the skyscraper is a segment of  the enormous file, a part of the 
symbol factory that produces the billion of slips of paper that gear modern society into 
its daily shape. From the executive’s suite to the factory yard, the paper webwork is  
spun; a thousand rules you never made and don’t know about are applied to you by a 
thousand people you have not met and never will.”
What C. Wright Mills (1951: 189) tried to describe with these lines is not a negative utopia but 
a picture of the society of employees into which the US had turned during Second World 
War, at least according to his analysis. Long before digitalization and the “age of information” 
replaced paper by bites, Mills saw offices as a network, a communicative system of leader-
ship and coordination, organized by big hierarchical institutions.
Meanwhile this system of vast national bureaucracies has changed. Hierarchical centralized 
bureaucracies tend to be replaced by the plains of "Cubicle Land". With this  metaphor I 
would like to designate a global landscape of work cells separated by movable panels and 
connected via fibre optic cables, scattered across continents. While the bureaucratic struc-
ture of government has remained, it has lost its national segmentary character.
The morphology of bureaucratic rule is changing. Skyscrapers are no longer regarded by all 
as the icon of high modernity, but the office is still the stem cell of power. The organizational 
structure of offices has changed, too, since Mills wrote his analysis. However, the great uto-
pia of the modern ages, namely to govern society by the invention of coordinated and well-
organized offices in which information, competence, speed and force concur, is still  alive. 
"Governance" –  "global" and "good" – is the most recent reflection of this tendency in the 
language of political science. And while in modern times government was organized mostly 
in hierarchical organizations, it has meanwhile, as I shall argue, turned into a slightly different 
mode. It differs from earlier fantasies of government in its temporality and in its main modus 
operandi.  "Cubicle Land", the endless landscape of interconnected cubicle-like work cells 
scattered throughout the globe, is the backbone of internationalized rule in world society. It is 
this form of project-oriented bureaucratic rule that I want to outline in this article.
While sociologists noticed early on how important bureaucracies are, political science has 
been much slower in doing so. Max Weber noted that domination (Herrschaft) in everyday 
life simply means administration (Verwaltung). Ruling the world, done by states in the classic 
form of governments or in its more fashionable "governance" version is therefore, as I shall 
argue here, a question of administration. Whoever wishes to know what the political features 
of the world are, should look for the forms in which it is administered. Following political so-
ciologists like Weber and others, l would like to challenge currently dominating understan-
dings of international relations, which conceive world politics either in terms of competition 
between hierarchical political units called states or in the framework of the lofty concept of 
"governance".
In the academic field of International Relations, the issue of bureaucratic organization has 
only been dealt with occasionally. The role of bureaucracies in foreign policy was already 
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debated forty years ago (Allison 1971; Krasner 1972) without having had a large impact on 
current debates. In the last five years or so, the bureaucratic character of international or-
ganizations has been studied again  (Barnett/Finnemore 2004),  stimulating at least  more 
general investigations of the forms of organizations in international politics (Dingwerth et al. 
2009). However, these recent analyses only focus on international organizations, whereas in 
fact bureaucratic features are dominant in many more areas of politics. Therefore, the theses 
of this paper go much further:
1. The mode of bureaucratic rule is still the central feature of rule in contemporary world 
society. "Cubicle Land", the most recent decentralized but interconnected mode of bu-
reaucratic rule, cuts across national boundaries and permeates state organizations.
2. This mode of rule has a history that is identical with the history of administration and ma-
nagement. States and corporations have both enforced bureaucratic modes of rule, even 
if  they often  presented their  projects  under  very  different  headings.  This  mode has 
meanwhile become the basis of non-state organizations like NGOs as well.
3. Cubicle Land, at first sight an apolitical form of organization, is in fact a highly political 
phenomenon. It brims with the dynamics of power and attempts to turn power into domi-
nation. In the top echelon, priests and experts have monopolized wisdom on "salvation 
goods" (Heilsgüter). They preach and represent the dogma of the day, strong statehood 
in some decades, the liberal market idea for the subsequent decades, and so on. The 
interconnections they spin themselves are not organized, but constitute an international 
caste of intellectuals, experts and consultants. They rule by discourse, by the creation of 
symbolic capital that sometimes includes state institutions, and sometimes plays with the 
alleged opposite of the state, the market. The experts create a language of "overall ob-
jectives" and "verifiable indicators" that low-ranking officers have to push through with 
the office staff in bureaucratic organizations. Subordinated to this "elite" is a bulk of offi-
cers, leading cadres, or executive managers (leitende Angestellte). This stratum orga-
nizes the armies of office workers, placed in cubicles in which they execute the orders of 
the day.
4. Cubicle Land is a form of rule and domination that emerges in various fields. It is most 
visible in development politics and in various policy fields in which the European Union is 
expanding its rule within member states. One primary example of it is science policy.
5. The newness of "Cubicle Land" consists in  its temporality.  Cubicle Land differs from 
older,  more  centralized  and  more  hierarchical  forms  of  bureaucratic  rule  in  that  it 
functions  according  to  a  project  logic.  Projects  are  short-term  policies  stipulating 
attainable goals ("project purposes") that must be achieved in periods of between three 
months and three years. Older forms of government, Soviet and Western style alike, 
were projects, too, and also driven by utopian ideas. Cubicle Land differs from that logic 
by the parcelling out of single steps in order to increase the control of political processes, 
especially  the implementation of utopian ideas which follow "expectational  concepts" 
(Erwartungsbegriffen)  such  as  "peace",  "democracy",  "freedom"  or  "justice"  that  are 
characterized by their unattainability. This form of bureaucratic domination also produces 
a new form of employees, new subjects as a result of a new "assujetissement".
As political scientists, we usually imagine rule and domination in a different way to what is 
suggested here. Government is thought of in terms of the rule of institutions as they are des-
cribed in political science textbooks entitled, for example, "Introduction to the political system 
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of [Country X]". Public and private administrations, offices and their practices only very rarely 
appear in such books. Alternatively, government is conceived of as being the government of 
persons or groups of persons or of "institutions". What I address in this paper is the "rule of 
nobody", as Hannah Arendt (1990: 59) famously phrased the logic of modern bureaucratic 
domination, in its most recent epitomization.
Cubicle Land is another example for the malleability of bureaucratic rule. It produces in its 
historical forms its own orders and hierarchies. Cubicle Land is the latest stage of a global 
culture of office employees who are suitable for jobs in international organizations, EU de-
partments, academia or non-governmental organizations or government positions. What they 
do in their professional lives – writing applications, researching data, compiling reports, con-
structing accounts and stories, presenting "facts" and mediating between viewpoints – is to-
tally identical. Only the contents of such practices vary. Practices like producing texts and 
graphs and presenting bits of communication in writing and orally are required in all subsys-
tems called "policies".
Such a thesis, that the world is ruled by an international bureaucracy parcelled into sub-units 
of states and other organizations, stands of course in contradiction to established ways of 
conceiving world politics. Most theories of world politics conceive states as the main actors 
and see them in a conflictive relation rather than as parts of a system.
The empirical foundation of my argument is scattered and not yet systematized.1 In the next 
section I will delve into two policy fields, namely development policy and science policy. The 
purpose of these empirical excursions is rather to elucidate my argument. Solid proof, strong 
enough to defeat alternative theoretical viewpoints, can only be delivered later, after having 
carried out some systematic research. The purpose of my paper is therefore rather to pro-
voke comments that will help me to design such research.
I cannot deal with all theoretical strands here, but instead, in the final section, I will address 
the most fundamental theoretical issues related to my argument. For reasons of delineations 
a few remarks on the current theoretical landscapes might be in order. In addition to so-
called post-positivist understandings, three interpretations of world politics can currently be 
distinguished. These are:  multipolarity,  empire  and global  governance. It  is  probably  not 
mistaken to assume that these three paradigms dominate the field of International Relations. 
Common to all three is the assumption that the crucial importance of states is a given.
The most widespread assumption, as found in the mass media and a lot of scholarly work as 
well, sees the world as a world of competing states. Governments in capitals make decisions 
in order to pursue their goals in a zero-sum game. All states are hierarchically organized, 
with their respective heads of states at the top echelon. And all states pursue relative gains, 
so that states' actions can be best accounted for by rationalist models. Cooperation between 
states is difficult these days as no single state can act as hegemon in our multipolar world.2
1 Evidence,  however,  is not  hard to  find.  Apart  from the cited  literature  it  stems from my own 
observations in Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Uganda, France and Germany over the last ten years while 
teaching  or  conducting  research  there.  Additional  information  comes from  conversations  with 
employees of NGOs in Haiti, Sudan, Germany and in my own professional field, "political science" 
as an institutionalized academic activity.
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Another notion of world politics follows the concept of empire. There is evidence to support 
this viewpoint, too: US military expenditure, for example, is as high as that of the next 15 
most spending countries combined, more than half a million US soldiers are based overseas, 
and even if  this does not yet constitute an empire, a number of serious scholars use this 
concept to describe US foreign policy (Laurens 2009, Münkler 2005).
In  contrast  to these two approaches, representatives of  a  “global governance” paradigm 
identify a new pattern in world politics. They claim that politics between states is not always a 
zero-sum game.  Synergies between states, international  organizations,  private  firms and 
NGOs are possible and need to be realized in order to overcome "global problems". "Public-
private partnerships" are promoted as one of the most promising ideas for coming to terms 
with these issues by producing "collective goods" (cf. Risse/Lehmkuhl 2007).
I now want to sketch a fourth interpretation that draws instead on seminal authors of political 
sociology. Max Weber, Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are, as I argue, 
helpful in conceptualizing a political world that I call Cubicle Land. 
Bureaucratic  domination,  the most  pertinent  feature of  politics  in  world  society,  is  rather 
overlooked by classical approaches of IR. They focus far too much on the horizontal struc-
ture of states in their depiction of world politics, thereby overlooking the essence of what 
these institutions do, namely: practice bureaucracy. State and non-state bureaucracies al-
ready formed a global system of bureaucracies a long time ago. This global bureaucratic 
domination has a history, and Cubicle Land is only the most recent stage of development in 
the bureaucratization of the world. This history is a global one that is not linear but marked by 
disruptions, hybrids, pushes and halts.
2 A paradigmatic case of such "power politics" is the "great game" of Russia, China, the US and the 
EU in Central Asia. On the inappropriateness of such conceptions for inter-state relations in the 
region cf. Heathershaw 2007. Similar ideas stimulate the discussion about China’s role in Africa 
and the allegedly waning role of EU member states there (cf. French 2004).
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2. The global history of bureaucracy
It is a common wisdom among sociologists that any form of domination needs a group of 
people to govern, and that this group always has some form of organization. However, this 
form does not need to be bureaucratic, and not all bureaucracies take on the same guise as 
the one that emerged in early modern Europe. It is this form, though, that has been globa-
lized, first by the process of European expansion (cf. Reinhard 1999), and later by the end-
less interweaving of international organizations. In this section I will first outline how this form 
developed historically, and then try to briefly describe its globalization.
2.1 The emergence of modern bureaucracy
It was the Physiocrat Vincent de Gournay (1712-1759) who coined the expression 'bureau-
cracy', ironically by critizising it. He observed that functionaries in absolutist France showed 
the tendency to accumulate more and more power in their hands and this rendered him 
sceptical about governments' real chances of implementing decisions. This criticism of bu-
reaucratic rule never died out and it still  inspires the mostly denunciatory use of the term. 
Sociologically it was defined much later. The term designates a type defined by Max Weber. 
Based on codified law, an "unpersonal order", educated officials work in organizations that 
are structured hierarchically and according to competences. Within these organizations, re-
cords and written documents are generated and compiled, and functionaries may not dis-
pose of means individually but are bound to rules in their decisions (may not make decisions 
independently but are bound to rules and procedures?). The office becomes the "kernel of 
any modern associational life" (Weber 1985: 126), and state officials (Beamte) who have 
their counterparts in private businesses/in the private sector, too, are remunerated finan-
cially, they have no other sources of income, and are subordinated to a strict system of disci-
pline and control. On the other hand, they are offered a career path (Laufbahn). Precision, 
consistency, discipline, and reliability – it is the calculability of bureaucratic apparatuses that 
render them so precious and efficient in the eye of power-holders, even in early modern 
times. It  evolved, however, simultaneously with capitalism, as capitalism and bureaucracy 
constitute each other. Not only states and churches were bureaucratically organized, but also 
"armies,  political  parties,  private  firms,  professional  associations,  clubs,  foundations  and 
whatever else" (Weber 1985: 128).3 Bureaucracy therefore is not just an organizational issue; 
it  is  an  intrinsically  political  phenomenon  since  any  administration  is  government.  Fur-
thermore, modern political systems, too, are shaped by bureaucratic logics. Bureaucracy, as 
Weber put it, is the "inescapable shadow of mass democracies" (Weber 1985: 130).
All explanations of the rise of bureaucracies draw on long structural processes. While they 
officially exist in order to solve particular problems, to allow governments to "steer" societies, 
they emerged as tools of domination, as machines of monarchs in order to extract resources 
3 In this sense, modern bureaucracies are different from patrimonial forms. In India and China, of 
course,  we find forms of bureaucracies much earlier than in Europe. They linger, however, like 
forms of  feudalism, between centralization and local  patrimonialization:  incumbents of  positions 
appropriate  the  chances  they  have  been  granted,  and  these  practices  impede  genuine 
rationalization. It seems as if the unfolding of  modern bureaucracies is interconnected with the 
historical development of modern capitalism.
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out of societies. Such resources were needed to fund warfare and prestige cults of royal 
courts (cf. Jacoby 1969). From its very beginning, the history of bureaucracies is therefore 
closely related to inter-state relations. Very soon, states began to mimic each others' bu-
reaucracies. The parallel emergence of the monopoly of violence and the monopoly of taxa-
tion that Otto Hintze, Norbert Elias and Charles Tilly have reconstructed so carefully also 
required the rationalization of state organization (Raphael 2000: 21), ending up in related 
bureaucratic patterns.
Some authors therefore explain bureaucratization with functionalist theorems: differentiation, 
prolonged chains of interrelated actions and the need for coordination led to rationalization, 
and this ultimately meant the calculation of means and organization in a bureaucratic manner 
that would order actions and orders (procedures and commands?) cognitively, structure them 
logically  and systematize  them (Breuer 1994: 41).  We know that  this  ideal  was not  yet 
achieved in early modern European states, but during the 19th century the growth and ra-
tionalization of bureaucracies became a trans-European trend (cf. Osterhammel 2009: 866 
ff.).
When monopolies of violence were "published" (made public?) by bourgeois revolutions, as 
Norbert  Elias  put  it,  state  bureaucracies  were  opened up  as  professional  fields  for  the 
emerging middle classes as well. The German types of functionaries (Berufsbeamte) were 
an integrative measure in constitutional monarchies to include further groups into the appa-
ratus of rule in order to stabilize it (Wunder 1986: 67; Dreyfus 2000). From then onwards the 
state became a popular career choice as new groups learned quickly that state offices were 
a means to social mobility.
Apart from such micro-mechanisms that fostered the validity and acceptance of bureaucra-
cies, one could look at the enormous growth of them also in terms of global functional re-
quirements: According to Niklas Luhmann, for example, organization is a function of social 
differentiation (2010: 59), and the fact that the political organization of world society is seg-
mented into increasingly bureaucratic states only conceals a parallel process to the rise of 
"national economies", which in fact constituted a world market. There might be a global bu-
reaucratic system, too.
The emergence of the largest modern bureaucracies took place in the early 20th century, 
when banks and insurance companies were only able to administer the vast amounts of in-
formation by numeric codifications. This was the birth of "data systems" (Mills 1951: 193), 
and this again shows that the history of bureaucracies is not merely a state affair. All large 
businesses, not only trusts, show similar organizational features, and their typical personnel, 
the employee, is just an equivalent to the state official (Krakauer 1930). The development of 
the Western welfare state, therefore, is nothing more than a convergence of bureaucratic 
modes of administering lives.
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2.2 The globalization of bureaucracies
Like the history of parliaments and constitutions, the history of bureaucracies is one of im-
ports  and  exports,  appropriations  and  reformulations.  Such  migrations  of  organizational 
forms first took place in Europe. Colonialism and its projects then became one big vector for 
the global spread of this form of political organization. From the era of colonialism, as many 
case studies show, one can draw a direct line to the practices of project logic that I call Cubi-
cle Land. On the other hand, there are also deliberate importations of European bureaucracy 
into other parts of the world like China and Japan (cf. Reinhard 1999: 491-509).4 In all in-
stances, of course, the migrating concept also incorporated local traditions and forms once it 
was implemented.
One of the most prominent examples for the bureaucratization of rule was of course the So-
viet Union, if not Tzarist Russia. Very early, non-dogmatic communism denounced "real exis-
ting socialism" as merely bureaucracy that only privileges a stratum of functionaries and offi-
cials  (cf.  Rizzi  1985). The critique of this "nomenclatura" then became a constant theme 
among dissident voices in Eastern Europe and wherever else socialism was practiced (cf. 
Djilas 1957). Although during the Cold War this criticism was of course easily used and per-
haps at times exaggerated by Western opponents as proof of its own righteousness, there 
can be little doubt that social and political realities in the entire former Soviet empire were 
shaped by extremely bureaucratic practices.
ISAF in Afghanistan and MONUC in the DR Congo are not the first to learn that modern bu-
reaucracies are contingent on the prevailing social preconditions. Colonial administrators, 
too, had to compromise with local authorities and live with suboptimal outcomes of their en-
deavours (cf. Spittler 1981; von Trotha 1994). The major consequence of colonial bureaucra-
tization, however, was the implementation of an ideal that survived in Dar es Salaam as well 
as in Delhi, Djakarta or Tashkent (cf. Eckert 2007; Bichsel 2009).
Stories, forms and shapes differed of course, constituting diverse trajectories. In Central Asia 
a late kind of adaptation of Soviet-type bureaucratic rule was developed (Geiss 2007), while 
in South Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa, and, again much earlier, in Latin America, colonial rule 
led to a veritable surge of bureaucratization from the 18th century onwards. Like the Ottoman 
Empire, China and Japan deliberately introduced administrative reforms along the lines of 
the European model. The Ottoman Empire, though, turned into a precursor of today's inter-
nationally administered spaces when its debt crisis induced informal take-overs by European 
powers.
Once again, financial administration seemed to indicate a tendency that would later be ob-
served  elsewhere,  too.  Maybe  its  need  to  "rule  by  calculation"  (Beherrschen  durch 
Berechnen, Weber 1919: 594) gives it the function of a vector of bureaucratization.
The history of the British Empire is, hence, a history of the globalization of bureaucracy, too. 
As Niall Ferguson (2003) has shown, bureaucratic forms like currency and loan systems, the 
4 Ironically,  re-importations  took  place  as  well.  In  the  late  1960s,  impressed  and  alarmed  by 
Japanese success on different world markets, Western management theory studied practices and 
models  there  in  order  to  draw  lessons  that  would  keep  Western  corporate  government 
"competitive" (cf. Boltanski/Chiapello 2003).
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Common Law and the ideal of an efficient Civil Service were exported and locally entrenched 
by imperial expansion. It would probably not be a major challenge to show how other colonial 
empires developed different, but similar forms of rule by bureaucratic means.
It was most likely during the 19th century that the foundations of today's political structures 
were laid, including the main bureaucracies in Europe (cf. Osterhammel 2009; Bayart 2004). 
The expansion of the world market and the structural features of world politics emerged si-
multaneously (cf. Schlichte 2011) both bringing about a spread of bureaucratic features of 
rule. In retrospect, the continuation of that global formation into the late 20th century and the 
present day might (one day?) be regarded as the age of the internationalization of rule due to 
global bureaucracies developing their own momentum.
The globalization of bureaucracies has, of course, not only been the work of states and cor-
porations. Studies in  standardizations have shown that especially  associations are major 
contributors to  the  fabric  of  global  norms  and compatibility,  and  these homogenizations 
meanwhile apply to anything from handball to the registration of endangered bird species 
(Brunsson/Jacobsson 2000: 3). Human rights as well as environment issues typify the kind of 
political fields in which associations do politics by bureaucratic means nowadays. Any new 
regulation inspires a new bureaucratic tool for monitoring and administering. This, it seems, 
applies particularly in those cases where regulations cross state borders, as in the case of 
issue areas defined as "global problems", which are addressed by means of immense pro-
grammes like "state-building" or the creation of the "European Research Area" (cf. Bruno 
2008).
3. Cubicle Land – the latest stage of bureaucratic rule
The classic understanding of bureaucracies is shaped by the image of vast hierarchical or-
ganizations. The emergence of such organizations was the life-world experience of Max We-
ber and other founding authors of sociology in the early  20th century like Robert Michels 
(1911), who worked on the growing importance of political consequences of bureaucratiza-
tion. Many later scholars and also the emergent literature of management studies and or-
ganizational theory have pointed out that this concept was inspired by the ideal-typical un-
derstanding of armies. Strictly separated strict rank hierarchies, direct command-obedience 
relations and clearly defined competences are the core characteristics of such an organiza-
tional concept.
For a long time this ideal of bureaucratic organization prevailed. It first came under criticism 
from the literature on management theory and subsequently, since the late 1980s, in policies 
of Western states. Under the guise of "new public management", a discursive shift took place 
that – in the rhetoric and self-understanding of its proponents – is anti-bureaucratic. In prac-
tice, however, such policies simply reproduce and enlarge the bureaucratic character of poli-
tics. What has changed, however, as I will argue, is the mode of bureaucratic organization.
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The project logic of Cubicle Land has been developing in certain areas (issue areas?) of in-
ternational  relations as well.  A  great deal of these changes is  attributable  to the  rise  of 
NGOs. While assumptions about the number of NGOs around the globe go into millions 
(McGann/Johnstone 2006), the triplication of the number of NGOs registered as having a 
consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council5 between 1985 and 2005 indi-
cates that there has been a clear trend towards a professionalization – and that means bu-
reaucratization – of these organizations. Their rise is certainly also due to a new trend in the 
practice of Western governments of delegating the implementation of development and other 
tasks to such organizations, as having less people on the payroll keeps state bureaucracies 
slim and flexible.
It would be naïve to assume that this change might indicate a decrease in bureaucratic prac-
tices. In fact, the opposite is more likely to be the case, as the amount of time spent on the 
highly competitive application market has rather grown. Writing applications, documenting 
implementation, organizing evaluations and writing reports has become the major activity of 
NGO management staff.
As a consequence, the field of development assistance is meanwhile dominated by the logic 
of projects, short-term thinking and an overburdened discourse. The European Union has 
become one massive machine in the production of projects, one of which being the EU itself. 
Numerous authors have remarked on the advance of "private" actors even in classic fields of 
international relations such as diplomacy (Kappeler 2003: 57). It is therefore hard to tell how 
many people on the globe are caught up in the logic I am describing here.
Cubicle Land is an appropriate metaphor for sketching this logic, as it designates the vast 
landscapes of cells, often extending across whole storeys, in which most white collar em-
ployees throughout the world meanwhile work. These cells are not discrete rooms, but are 
separated off  by  movable  partition  panels,  each cell  covering  2,3  square  meters.  Stan-
dardized as cubicles by companies that offer this furniture, these cells are of course inter-
connected by phone and digital communication networks. As a consequence, it has become 
much harder to tell where one organization ends and where the next one begins. Cubicle 
Land has become, in fact, one country.
In order to delineate this outline of changes in how the world is governed, I will elucidate this 
impression in three steps: a short sketch of the techniques and practices in Cubicle Land will 
be followed by a number of theses on its internal political structures. A rather theoretical part 
of the analysis will deal with the temporality of this form of organization and the endlessness 
of projects.
5 Cf. (http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/pdf/INF_List.pdf) accessed July 27, 2010.
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Techniques and practices
Bureaucratic domination has always had a material and a personal aspect. Its history could 
be told both as a story of commodification of the labour of rule and of increasingly abstract 
systems of knowledge production and administration. In its inner life, however, bureaucracy 
has always maintained a deeply personal aspect. Fictional portraits of bureaucratic charac-
ters in literature, for example, share two common recurrent features. From Herman Melville 
to Nicolai Gogol, Italo Svevo and Wilhelm Genazino, they all discuss the monotony of paper 
work and the cruelty of superiors and colleagues in Boston, Moscow, Trieste and Frankfurt. 
These novels are also instructive when it comes to what bureaucrats actually do. In 19th-
century offices, book-keeping was the central activity. Bureaucracies compiled information on 
people, businesses, property and so on. This information, as Gerhard Spittler (1980) has 
shown, formed the backbone of state authority as it made it possible to track down indivi-
duals and created the illusion of having an all-encompassing overview of social life.
In the decades after 1900, automatization set in. Punch cards, franking machines, mail sor-
ting machines and later electronic data processing and storage completely transformed the 
organization of bureaucracies (Gardey 2008). However, they continued to depend on people 
with a knowledge of the social relations within organizations, routine methods and contexts. 
While the use and storage of information became depersonalized, the actual fabric of bu-
reaucratic  organization has maintained a personal aspect, even though no single person 
within it has a universal knowledge of its functioning or of the information administered. In-
stead,  selling  ideas and visions,  presented in  PowerPoint,  has become  more  and more 
prominent, and continues to grow in importance as one reform chases the next.
Two major features of bureaucratic rule have remained, however. Firstly, the gap between 
bureaucratically produced images and social reality has not been closed. In fact, it has pos-
sibly even grown. Secondly, human beings have not disappeared, either, so that very per-
sonal aspects of power and domination have continued to exist, juxtaposed and intertwined 
with technical systems that build power structures by themselves.
What political science textbooks euphemistically call "policy cycles" has become the most 
recent mode of bureaucratic rule. The design of policies, their implementation, supervision, 
evaluation and re-design, determines by and large what bureaucracies do. Policy papers, 
concept papers, monitoring and reporting have become the main activities at all levels, from 
the higher EU echelons to every NGO bush office in  the field of developmental  aid  (cf. 
Schlichte/Veit 2007). This practice ranges from the monthly report sheets of individual deve-
lopment projects to the annual "World Development Report" of the World Bank Group which 
each year coins another key phrase that promises salvation.
The compilation of data and its interpretation for the purpose of "improving policies" and de-
signing new projects is still a crucial activity in Cubicle Land. Frequently, the purpose of data 
is not so much administration but increasingly just a feature in the process of reformulating 
policies. It is no coincidence that social sciences are often involved in this process, standing 
as they do in the long tradition of the relation between states and statistics. In any case, the 
production of self-referential texts, be they internal briefings, reports, policy recommenda-
tions or published annual reports, is the principle activity in Cubicle Land.
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Internal political structures
Generally speaking, the history of management is a continuous refinement of instruments for 
controlling the labor force (Boltanski/Chiapello 2003: 120). Cubicle Land is simply the latest 
stage in this process. Project employees who – in consistency with the new mode – are ex-
pected to regulate themselves, are the most recent outcome.
Bureaucracies, both state and non-state, are now conceived to be leaner and flatter. They do 
without a number of former layers of hierarchy and they outsource all functions that are not 
part of the core business. This applies to Ministries of Development as well as to universities. 
As a consequence, there has been an inconceivable increase in employees who no longer 
have permanent employment contracts with state agencies but are hired for short-term pro-
jects. This places even higher demands on individual employees to achieve well. They have 
to develop networks of contacts in order to survive in a more flexible, highly volatile profes-
sional environment. These networks replace the old career advancement patterns in hierar-
chical, unilocal bureaucracies.
However, power differences have not vanished. These self-organizing units need leadership, 
too (Boltanski/Chiapello 2003: 115). All related issues such as power, legitimacy and domi-
nation have remained, even if the way they actually function is veiled by a smoke-screen of 
independence, freedom and choice. Leadership is achieved less through bossism and more 
through internalized forms of self-organization by the cubicle inmates.
Leaders in Cubicle Land have become team leaders. Instead of sober commands and bu-
reaucratic rules, they need to use "visions" to stimulate a workforce that cannot be motivated 
by money alone. This "vision" is a way of organizing followership without commanding force. 
It is rather a form of staged charisma. Leaders become more like coaches of sport teams and 
resemble less and less the old type of bosses. Motivation and mobilization become their 
main tasks.
These changes also can be seen in nomenclatures. Former bosses turn into "managers", 
and dusty administration turns into "management" or "governance". Managers are no longer 
commanding officers, but must be inspiring thinkers, giving impulses, motivating and being 
themselves motivated, being generalist  and creative (Boltanski/Chiapello 2003: 119). Em-
ployees are required to be creative too, as organizations no longer need simple 'jobsworths' 
who only act under orders, but want to hire the entire personality who has to adapt him- or 
herself  to the expected format to that end. "Management by objective", the innovation of 
management theory in the 1960s, has thus paved the way for a new mode of internal politics 
within organizations.
The temporality of Cubicle Land – the endlessness of project logic
Cubicle Land is ruled by concepts that historian Reinhart Koselleck (2006: 68) has called 
"expectational conceptions" (Erwartungsbegriffe). "Good governance" in politics, "excellence" 
in science, or "development" in economies are not accidentally keywords of our age. These 
concepts have moving horizons, and the fact that there is no stable definition for them is not 
a disadvantage, but it does explain their discursive ubiquity. Such concepts now serve as 
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replacements for the old political utopia that revolved around emancipation, peace, demo-
cracy and justice.
Since the 18th century the meaning of such concepts have of course been contested, as have 
the  means to achieve these shifting horizons. The prevalence of  expectational  concepts 
might  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  individual  particular  interests  and  institutional  pro-
grammes coalesce here. The quest for "good governance" or "development" and the latest 
emphasis on "excellency" in academics or "sustainability" in development can, however, not 
be reduced to such interest coalitions. Their success lies in their quasi-religious character. 
These are secularized theological conceptions, as Reinhart Koselleck has shown for earlier 
versions like "progress" (Fortschritt) and "liberty" (Freiheit).
The current concepts of the temporality project in Cubicle Land stand for endless projections 
which are characterized by shifting horizons. Once a step has been accomplished, the hori-
zon again moves, which is of course instrumental for all those benefiting from the business. 
"Mission creep" in international organizations and NGOs should thus not just be understood 
as the result of institutional self-interest. It  is also, and perhaps even more importantly, a 
built-in mechanism based on visions and expectations.
The consequence of this temporality is an endless string of projects called "reform". This has 
its historical roots in the governmentality of the Early Modern State as analyzed by Michel 
Foucault (2004). To turn a society into an object of state intervention, to mould it according to 
the political imaginations of leaders is the very idea of "government" (Regierung). Reform is 
nowadays seemingly endless, and no longer a process with a marked beginning and a re-
cognizable end point. Reform has become a condition (Zustand) in itself. The precise pur-
pose of reforms is the pursuit of aims that can never be achieved. The legitimacy of reform, 
and the endless projects arising out of it, is based on the non-fulfillment of its aims.
Now, Cubicle Land is a further stage in the history of bureaucratic reform. Contrary to earlier 
times, when not only decisions were taken centrally but also detailed plans were developed 
in departmentalized state offices, Cubicle Land is a system in which the inhabitants of cubi-
cles have to invent their futures themselves, of course within the frame of targets set else-
where. Individual project workers, but particularly their superiors, have to draft future pro-
jects; they even have to turn their biographies into projects that show neither times of idle-
ness nor stagnation. The subjects of Cubicle Land have to invent projects, forge plans, build 
networks and maintain their contacts (Boltanski/Chiapello 2003: 156). All this is part of their 
value on the labor market in Cubicle Land.
In these markets of ideas and personnel the most important thing is, among other things, to 
raise an awareness of one's own activities and to create appeal (Boltanski/Chiapello 2003: 
160). This becomes more important than the actual content. The importance of "impact fac-
tors" in the academic sector of Cubicle Land is one of the most visible proofs of this rule. Be-
cause content actually becomes less and less important, subjects also become interchange-
able as long as they master the rules of this game of attracting attention. In the respective 
biographies one will  find patterns of nomadism (Deleuze/Guattari 1992: 522) as a conse-
quence of these rules. The successful inhabitant of Cubicle Land has to obey an imperative 
of "unboundedness".
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4. Conclusion: Political Science – a bureaucratic practice
Cubicle Land can be discussed in various regards. One would concern the causality of the 
observations: Why is there a change in bureaucratic modes? One answer to that question 
might  hint  at  growing  interdependencies  that  render  hierarchical  forms  of  leadership 
(Steuerung) inefficient and inappropriate (Scharpf 2000: 290). Another thesis could be deve-
loped  along  the  argument  of  "gaining  its  own  momentum"  (Eigendynamik) 
(Mayntz/Nedelmann 1987). A third one, more in line with critical political economy, would 
perhaps stress the commercialization of public functions.
Bureaucratic forms of rule appear in our liberal age as something annoying but not utterly 
dangerous. One point of discussion and criticism has always been its tense relation to de-
mocratic ideals. Political theory has always taken this seriously, and there is a long list of 
authors ranging from Alexis  de Tocqueville,  Robert  Michels  and Max Weber to  Hannah 
Arendt, who saw the rise of state bureaucracies as an existential threat to what, in her under-
standing, politics is actually all about. "Domination by nobody", as she called it (Arendt 1990: 
59), can surely be regarded as a threat to democratic principles like transparency and ac-
countability.
I would like to conclude this paper on another note, though. One could regard Cubicle Land 
as just another form of bureaucracy. My impression, which still  needs empirical testing, is 
that its dangers go beyond that, especially for the social sciences. Political science, espe-
cially the productions of "experts" and "analysts", are part of this form of rule. At least in de-
velopment and security policy they produce reduced images of complex realities in remote 
areas, selling them under labels that are congruent with general notions that bureaucratic 
headquarters – be they governmental or not – have of "developing" areas. The entire dis-
course on "organized crime", "international terrorism" and "failed states" is a product of this 
kind of anticipatory obedience to assumed expectations (cf. Heathershaw 2007).
In this sense one might say that a vast part of political science and, of course, of International 
Relations comprises simply participating in a bureaucratic language game. Bureaucracies 
need this kind of language to categorize a social reality they could otherwise not administer. 
With the growth of international organizations, state and non-state ones alike, it has become 
apparent that the globalization of discourse made these categories even broader. The more 
the organizations tend to cover, the emptier their categories become.
This language, however, has real consequences. When it is reproduced in media and aca-
demia, it shapes a perception of a world that is not only much more complex but perhaps 
totally different from what bureaucratic politics define for their organizational reasons. "Failed 
states" in Africa, "organized crime" as the main feature of the successor states of the Soviet 
Union, and the "dangers of Islamism" become generalized perceptions that shape politics. 
This is much more than the "constitutive power" Barnett and Finnemore found in the activity 
of international organizations (2004: 17). In fact, it creates a world image that legitimizes in-
creasingly intrusive interventions.
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The function of political science is, in my view, to keep a critical distance from the bureau-
cratically produced notions of the world. Otherwise it risks becoming part of the "doxa" that 
Bourdieu had in mind when he said that "we are thought by a state which we believe to think" 
(1998: 93). Without a critical distance that allows for an empirically based understanding of a 
still under-researched world, political science and IR just remain a part of Cubicle Land.
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